Sovereignty Conflicts and International Law and Politics
A Distributive Justice Issue
BOOK PREVIEW: Chapter Four: How far can sovereign States cooperate together and limit their freedom without sacrificing their sovereignty?
The previous Chapter showed that egalitarian shared sovereignty is a fair way of dealing with sovereignty conflicts and that it is unreasonable to reject it as a way of solving them. That is because the fairness of the outcomes of the original position was secured by the conditions under which the choice was made. It is now time to evaluate if the general principles of the egalitarian shared sovereignty can be extended to workable institutions that realise these principles. That is the aim of this Chapter, to work out what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would best, realise the egalitarian shared sovereignty.
In order to work out the institutions, some actual sovereignty conflicts will be used. These conflicts will fulfil the criteria defined at the beginning of this book—i.e. two sovereign States and a populated third territory. Moreover, the attention will be centred on some of the elements that constitute these particular sovereignty conflicts and that are constitutive of any political society, national or international—i.e. population, territory, government, and law. Indeed, as it would be theoretically impossible and practically cumbersome for a monograph to aim to cover every single aspect of the third territory, criteria will be introduced to select those elements that will be reviewed.
A further point must be made clear before working out what sort of arrangements and institutions may best realise the egalitarian shared sovereignty. Although this Chapter will explore the applicability of the egalitarian shared sovereignty in some real cases they are only used as part of a theoretical exercise. Ergo, relevant non-ideal issues—e.g. lack of compliance—will not be considered. It is assumed that all parties are reasonable and rational and want to resolve their conflict without violence. To put this in another way, this book only claims it would be unreasonable to reject its outcome—i.e. the egalitarian shared sovereignty—should all ideal and assumed conditions were present.